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1. Introduction
Semanticists sometimes talk about “aspectual mismatches,” that is, mismatches between the
assumed aspectual properties of predicates and modifiers that do not result in unacceptability.
For example, consider jump, as used in ( 1 ) ; it accepts punctual modifiers as in (1a), in which
case it expresses an instantaneous event, but yet it also accepts non-punctual, durative modifiers,
as in (1b), in which case it denotes a repeated series of jumping, which as a whole is a non-
punctual event :
( 1 ) a. Susan jumped at seven o’clock.
b. Susan jumped until dawn.
The observation that the verb denotes either a punctual moment or a duration depending on the
modifier supports the idea that different kinds of temporal modifiers can only attach to predi-
cates with different aspectual properties (in this case, instantaneous and durative). However, if
we accept the idea that the aspectual properties of predicates are uniquely specified in the lexi-
con, jump should lexically express either an instantaneous event or a durative event, not both,
and whichever option is adopted, we would have to say that either one of (1ab) constitutes an
instance of aspectual mismatch.
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However, this conclusion hinges upon the assumption that jump is lexically specified for its
(non-)punctuality ; if it is lexically ambiguous between a punctual and a durative interpretation
(or the punctual/durative distinction is lexically underspecified)1, neither of (1ab) will consti-
tute aspectual mismatch. Should we, then, say that jump, for example, lexically selects an instan-
taneous or a durative event interpretation, with the lexically unselected interpretation derived
on-line in a sentential context by some sort of coercion operation (aspectual mismatch), or that
the lexical entry for jump simply does not care about (non-)punctuality (underspecification)?
Brennan & Pylkkanen (2008) contrast the following three as the logical possibilities :
Underspecification : Predicates such as jump are lexically underspecified as to the punctuality of
their denotations.
Iterative Coercion : The denotations of predicates such as jump are lexically specified as punctual
events but can be shifted on-line to iterations of such punctual events, which take time.
Punctual Coercion : The denotations of predicates such as jump are lexically specified as durative
events, but can be shifted on-line to single, punctual events.
Brennan & Pylkkanen claim to have obtained behavioral evidence supporting Iterative Coercion.
The purpose of this paper is to argue that they misconstrued the issue and misinterpreted the
result of their own behavioral experiment2.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a critical illustration of the
background for Brennan & Pylkkanen’s (2008) behavioral experiment. Section 3 summarizes
their behavioral experiment in question. Section 4 points out the defect of their interpretation of
the experimental results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Background
2.1 On the Previous Theoretical Discussions
Iterative Coercion and Punctual Coercion are instantiations of the aspectual mismatch analysis,
and in the absence of constraints on how the assumed coercion operation works, they predict that
both instantaneous and durative interpretations should be freely available, a result that Under-
specification predicts without the help of an additional lexical (non-)punctual specification or an
additional coercion operation. Thus, unless some constraints are pointed out on the availability
of either instantaneous or durative interpretations, theoretical parsimony would definitely favor
Underspecification.
Since Brennan & Pylkkanen present the three logical possibilities not only as logical possi-
bilities but also as options that have actually been proposed in the theoretical literature, we
would expect that some empirical motivations, in the form of the unavailability of either instan-
taneous or durative interpretations, for an aspectual mismatch analysis have been presented in
the literature they cite. A look at the literature they cite, however, reveals that their review of
the theoretical literature is rather surprisingly wrong.
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First, Brennan & Pylkkanen cite Moens & Steedman (1988) as claiming Underspecification.
As seen above, this would be the most economical analysis, and hence, it would not be surprising
if such a proposal was made. However, Moens & Steedman in fact propose not Under-
specification but rather Iterative Coercion ; they propose an ATN-style coercion network, ac-
cording to which the kinds of durative (repetitive) interpretations in question should be derived
via coercion from instantaneous interpretations. Moens & Steedman’s motivations for such an
analysis for the durative interpretations are () their intuition that predicates such as jump or
wink denote instantaneous events by default, () the observation that those predicates do allow
progressive forms, and () the assumption that the semantics of the progressive requires that
non-progressive forms should denote durative events. Their intuition () leads them to assume
that the lexicon specifies instantaneous interpretations for those predicates, and the observation
() and the assumption () lead them to posit an instantaneous-to-durative coercion operation
for those predicates.
Putting aside whether the assumption () is justified or not3, Moens & Steedman’s treatment
would be justified if the durative interpretations are available only when required by something,
such as the progressive form. In fact, in the theoretical literature, Iterative Coercion seems most
widely assumed4, probably based partially on theoreticians’ intuition and partially on the as-
sumption that such predicates denote repetitions (durative events) only when required by, say,
durative modifiers, an assumption which may or may not be correct. (See the next paragraph.)
Second, Brennan & Pylkkanen attribute a proposal of Punctual Coercion to Rothstein (2004).
Conceptually, Punctual Coercion is rather unnatural, given that jump refers to a repetition of
jumping in its durative interpretation, each member of the repetition being also expressed by
jump under its punctual interpretation ; the durative interpretation is conceptually more compli-
cated by the punctual interpretation. Thus it would be very interesting if somebody proposed
Punctual Coercion on theoretical grounds. However, Rothstein’s treatment of the predicates in
question is in fact an instance of Underspecification.
Rothstein separates those predicates from achievement predicates and calls them “semelfac-
tives.” Rothstein adopts the assumption () for the semantics of the progressive, and hence, for
her, any predicate that allows progressive forms should be able to denote a durative event. In the
light of the observation that (some) achievement predicates accept progressive forms, she pro-
poses Iterative Coercion for achievement predicates. In other words, durative interpretations are
posited for achievement predicates only in order to accommodate, under the assumption (), the
fact that they allow progressive forms ; they do not seem to have durative interpretations in
non-progressive forms, and hence, achievement predicates are assumed to denote punctual
events lexically. In contrast, according to Rothstein, semelfactives allow both instantaneous and
durative interpretations in nonprogressive forms (in contrast to the assumption mentioned in the
above paragraph). If so, semelfactive predicates should accommodate both interpretations lexi-
cally, and hence, naturally, she assumes Underspecification for semelfactive predicates5.
It is clear from the design of the experiments that Brennan & and Pylkkanen targeted those
predicates which can denote both single instantaneous events and durative repetitions of such
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events, and they are exactly what Rothstein calls semelfactive predicates. Since Rothstein (2004)
is the only literature that Brennan & Pylkkanen cite as a claim of Punctual Coercion, we have to
say that Punctual Coercion was proposed by nobody, as far as Brennan & Pylkkanen’s review of
the theoretical literature is concerned.
2.2 On the Previous Experimental Results
Note that Underspecification itself only claims that (semelfactive) predicates lexically allow
both instantaneous and durative interpretations and hence is compatible with the idea that
different predicates have different preferences for instantaneous or durative interpretations (to
different degrees). Thus we can distinguish between two versions of Underspecification, namely
Total Underspecification and Weighted Underspecification. Total Underspecification claims
that no predicates has a bias toward instantaneous or durative interpretations, in contrast to
Weighted Underspecification, according to which different predicates have different prefer-
ences. For example, assume that jump pragmatically prefers a punctual interpretation. Upon
encountering jump, the parser keeps both a punctual and a durative interpretation as possibili-
ties, but puts a heavier weight on the former than on the latter, according to Weighted Under-
specification,6 since a durative interpretation would require promotion of the less weighted
durative interpretation over the more weighted punctual interpretation Weighted Underspecifi-
cation predicts an additional cost of the less weighted interpretation (in this case, the durative
one) just as a mismatch analysis (in this case, Iterative Coercion) predicts.
The predictions of the two versions of Underspecification differ not with respect to the
ranges of possible interpretations but rather with respect to how each interpretation is derived
on-line. Under Weighted Underspecification, non-favored interpretations should induce some
processing costs, in contrast to favored interpretations, whereas Total Underspecification pre-
dicts that both instantaneous and durative interpretations are accessible to the parser with equal
ease. Thus it is natural that the distinction between Total and Weighted Underspecification is
not made in the theoretical literature.
In fact, Total Underspecification will sound very implausible to experimentalists ; every
practicing experimentalist must be well aware that the parser is affected by a variety of factors,
including familiarities with, and frequencies of, the words in the sentence to be parsed. It is only
natural to expect different (semelfactive) predicates to be used under either instantaneous or
durative interpretations in different frequencies, so it is very inconceivable that the parser is
immune to such frequency effects. However, this is only a conceptual speculation, if not con-
firmed experimentally.
Empirically, Weighted Underspecification and the two Coercion analyses predict some
processing cost differences between instantaneous and durative interpretations, while Total
Underspecification denies such differences. Furthermore, while Iterative and Punctual Coer-
cion predict more costs for durative and instantaneous interpreations respectively, Weighted
Underspecification per se makes no prediction about which of durative and instantaneous inter-
pretations are more costly ; it simply depends on which predicates are biased toward which.
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Thus, it would be relatively easy to argue against Total Underspecification based on experimen-
tal evidence, because an observation of processing cost differences between instantaneous and
durative interpretations would be enough, but it would be relatively hard to argue against
Weighted Underspecification, because it could cope with processing cost differences with which-
ever direction.
This difficulty to tease apart the predictions of Weighted Underspecification and a Coercion
analysis was explicitly mentioned by Todorova et al. (2000). They conducted a self-paced read-
ing experiment within the stop-making-sense paradigm and obtained results that durative inter-
pretations are more costly than instantaneous interpretations. As they point out explicitly, such
results are compatible with either Weighted Underspecification (with the assumption that
punctual interpretations are preferred) or Iterative Coercion ; their goal was modest in the sense
that they only meant to confirm the existence of processing cost differences, which would argue
against Total Underspecification. However, Brennan & Pylkkanen interpret Todorova et al.
(2000) as claiming to have obtained experimental support for Iterative Coercion, in spite of
Todorova et al.’s explicit remark that their results are compatible with both Iterative Coercion
and Weighted Underspecification. Clearly Brennan & Pylkkanen interpreted Todorova et al.’s
results this way because they did not consider the weighted version of Underspecification (al-
though Todorova et al. explicitly mentioned it).
In addition to Todorova et al. (2000), Brennan & Pylkkanen also mention Pinango et al.
(1990), who, according to Brennan & Pylkkanen, claim to have obtained experimental evidence
for Iterative Coercion. As far as Pinango et al.’s own claim is concerned, this time Brennan &
Pylkkanen’s interpretation is correct. Pinango et al. observed additional processing costs for
durative interpretations in a cross-modal lexical decision experiment. For Pinango et al., Itera-
tive Coercion is the only theoretically available option, and hence they interpreted this result as
confirmation of Iterative Coercion.
However, as noted above, such results could well be interpreted in terms of Weighted
Underspecification. Indeed, Pinango et al. considered the possibility that the results are due to
plausibility, i.e., the possibility that their stimuli requiring durative interpretations were seman-
tically more implausible than those requiring punctual interpretations, and that was responsible
for the experimental result. They dismiss this possibility with a non-significant result of a ques-
tionnaire comparing semantic plausibilities of the two classes of stimuli. However, the question-
naire only examined off-line judgments, not on-line processes through which the stimulus
sentences are processed. Less weighted interpretations, under Weighted Underspecification,
only predict an additional processing cost, not offline semantic implausibility, and hence, their
questionnaire does not argue against Weighted Underspecification, which still remains as a
possible explanation of the result of their main experiment.
If we follow Brennan & Pylkkanen and ignore the Weighted version of Underspecification,
the above experiemntal results would both support Iterative Coercion, in which case there would
have been no motivation for Brennan & Pylkkanen to conduct further experiments. However,
Pickering et al. (2006) report results which, according to Brennan & Pylkkanen, were compatible
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only with Total Underspecification, and hence Brennan & Pylkkanen intended to resolve the
conflicting results of Pinang et al. (1999) and Todorova et al. (2000) on the one hand, and of
Pickering et al. (2006) on the other.
Pickering et al. asked whether the observed additional processing costs associated with
durative interpretations would generalize to normal comprehension situations, because in the
previous experiments the participants were required to comprehend the stimuli sentences in a
rather unnatural situation ; in Pinang et al.’s experiment, participants were required to compre-
hend spoken sentences while conducting a secondary lexical decision ; in Todorova et al.’s experi-
ment, the stop-making-sense task required participants to make unnaturally early elaborated
semantic decisions that would not be made in normal comprehension situations. Thus Pickering
et al. examined whether Pinang et al.’s and Todorova et al.’s results would be replicated in usual
self-paced reading and eye-tracking experiments, which were assumed to be closer to normal
comprehension situations. Pickering et al. found no significant differences between punctual and
durative interpretations, which, according to Pickering et al., suggest that Underspecification is
the right picture for normal comprehension processes ; Pinang et al.’s and Todorova et al.’s results
diverted from the predictions of Underspecification because of the unnatural experimental
settings.
Brennan & Pylkkanen intended their own behavioral experiment to resolve the conflict
between Pinang et al.’s and Todorova et al.’s results on the one hand, and Pickering et al.’s results
on the other. However, since Pickering et al.’s had already offered an account of the seeming
conflict, it was already resolved as far as Pickering et al.’s account is valid. Thus, another resolu-
tion would mean a rejection of Pickering et al.’s account and a proposal of an alternative. The
question, then, will be whether the results of Brennan & Pylkkanen’s behavioral experiment
constitute evidence against Pickering et al.’s account and a proposal of an alternative.
Before moving on to an examination of Brennan & Pylkkanen’s experiment, a final remark
should be made about Pinang et al.’s and Todorova et al.’s experiment. The instantaneous/
durative interpretations were manipulated with lexical choices of the verbal predicates in Pinang
et al.’s experiment, whereas they were manipulated with a completely different means in
Todorova et al.’s experiment, namely the number specifications of the grammatical objects. For
example, in their experiment, sentences such as (2a) were used in the “iterative coercion” condi-
tion, in contrast to sentences such as (2b) used in the “no coercion” condition :
( 2 ) a. Even though Howard sent a large check to his daughter for many years, she refused
to accept his money.
b. Even though Howard sent large checks to his daughter for many years, she refused
to accept his money.
The assumption here was that the underlined portion of (2a) should normally denote a single
sending event but refers to an iteration in this case because of the durative modifier for many
years, just as a lexically single-event-denoting jump denotes an iteration if accompanied by a
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durative modifier. However, this assumption may not necessarily be correct ; in classical
modeltheretical semantics, for many years is a (generalized) quantifier, and whether or not a large
check is treated also as a (generalized) quantifier or as a free variable, a scope interaction is
expected between a large check and for many years, in which case two different scope relations
(3ab) should be possible for (2a), which should result in interpretations (4ab) of the first
clause :
( 3 ) a. a large check ＞ for many years
b. for many years ＞ a large check
( 4 ) a. There exists a large check such that, for many years, Howard sent it to his daughter.
b. For each of the many years in question, there exists a large check such that Howard
sent it to his daughter that year.
(4b) is nothing but the intended iterative interpretation. In contrast, even though the bare plural
large checks is analyzed as a (generalized) quantifier, (2b) amounts to the same iterated interpre-
tation irrespective of how the assumed scope ambiguity is resolved. Thus an additional process-
ing cost associated with sentences like (2a), as compared to sentences like (2b), could well be
interpreted in terms of the assumption that object (or argument) quantifiers take wider scope
than modifier (or adjunct) quantifiers by default. Under such an interpretation, the difference
between a single event interpretation and an iteration interpretation of sent a large check is a
scope issue distinct from the difference between a single event interpretation and an iteration
interpretation of jump, which is a matter of how lexical verbal predicates are to be interpreted.
Thus there remains the possibility that Pinang et al.’s and Brennan & Pylkkanen’s experiment on
the one hand, and Todorova et al.’s experiment on the other, are dealing with different lingusitic
phenomena (although we will not be concerned with this issue in the rest of the paper).
This section first illustrates the design and the results of Brennan & Pylkkanen’s behavioral
experiment, after which two defects of their experiment will be pointed out.
The design of Brennan & Pylkkanen’s behavioral experiment closely mirrors that of Pickering et
al.’s (2006) first experiment (an examination of the interpretations of verbal predicates, with a
self-paced reading task), except for the choice of the verbs to be employed as stimuli. While
verbs were not selected on a principled basis in Pickering et al.’s experiments, Brennan &
Pylkkanen first conducted a pre-test, asking the participants to rate the naturalness of punctual
or iterated interpretations of supposedly punctual verbs. They constructed stimuli for the main
experiment employing those verbs which received high ratings for punctual interpretations in
the pretest. Following Pickering et al.’s stimuli manipulations, temporal modifiers were put at
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the beginning of stimuli sentences in the main experiment ; thus the verbs came after the tempo-
ral modifiers. Self-paced reading was the experimental task, and significantly longer reading
times were observed in the verb regions when the punctuality specifications by the modifiers and
by the verbs did not coincide than when they coincided. Brennan & Pylkkanen interpret this
result as support for Iterative Coercion.
3.2 No Resolution of the Seeming Conflict
As noted above, Brennan & Pylkkanen intended their experiment to resolve the seeming conflict
between Pinang et al.’s and Todorova et al.,’s results on the one hand, and Pickering et al.’s on the
other. Such a resolution should tell us why significant processing costs were observed in the
former but not in the latter. Pickering et al. had already offered such an account, but one could
argue against their account and propose an alternative.
For example, one interesting characteristic of Pickering et al.’s account concerns what re-
quires an early semantic decision. According to Pickering et al., Todorova et al. observed process-
ing cost differences because the stop-making-sense task required an early decision, while in their
own experiments, significant processing costs were not observed because nothing required such
an early decision. However, overt temporal modifiers signaling instantaneous or durative inter-
pretations were presented to the participants as parts of the stimuli sentences, and it does not
make good conceptual sense that such modifiers did not function as a prompt for early semantic
decisions while the Todorova et al. task does. Thus Pickering et al.’s account may not necessarily
be without a problem.
However, although they claim to have resolved the seeming conflict between Pinang et
al.’s and Todorova et al.’s results on the one hand, and Pickering et al.’s results on the other,
Brennan & Pylkkanen simply produced results similar to Pinang et al.’s and Todorova et al.’s
experiment, without telling us why similar results were not observed in Pickering et al.’s experi-
ments. This is not a resolution of the seeming conflict between Pinang et al.’s and Todorova et
al.’s results on the one hand, and Pickering et al.’s results on the other.
3.3 What Hypothesis Is or Is Not Supported
On the other hand, putting aside the resolution issue, how should Brennan & Pylkkanen’s own
experimental results be interpreted? In order to evaluate their results, we first have to distin-
guish three different versions of Weighted Underspecification.
Under Weighted Underspecification, which of punctual and durative interpretations are
most costly depends on which are favored by verbal predicates, and nothing requires that all
verbal predicates have the same preference. Thus, if all verbal predicates are assumed to favor
punctual interpretations (Version A), Weighted Underspecification will predict more costs with
durative interpretations than with punctual interpretations, a prediction also made by Iterative
Coercion ; if all verbal predicates are assumed to favor durative interpretations (Version B), it
will predict more costs with punctual interpretations than with durative interpretations, a predi-
cation also made by Punctual Coercion ; if different predicates are assumed to have different
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preferences, some favoring punctual interpretations and others favoring durative ones (Version
C), it will predict that both punctual and durative interpretations can be more costly than the
others, depending on the predicates, a prediction made by no other hypothesis.
Now, if Brennan & Pylkkanen have indeed obtained processing evidence for the existence of
a bias toward punctual interpretations, that would constitute an argument not only against Total
Underspecification but also against Punctual Coercion on the one hand, and Versions B and C
of Weighted Underspecification on the other. However, given their experimental design, this is
not the case.
For the sake of argument, assume Version C of Weighted Underspecification. Their choices
of the verbs to be employed in the stimuli for the main experiment was based on the results of
their pre-test, in which participants rated the biases of verbal predicates to single-event or itera-
tion interpretations ; only those verbs which were found to be highly biased toward single-event
interpretations were employed in the main experiment. However, under Version C of Weighted
Underspecification, the observation of more costs with durative interpretations than with punc-
tual interpretations, then, would be hardly surprising, because only those verbs which were
expected to result in such an observation were chosen in the first place. Thus, while Brennan &
Pylkkanen’s result is incompatible with Version B of Weighted Underspecification, it is compati-
ble not only with Version A but also with Version C of Weighted Underspecification ; their
result does not constitute empirical evidence against Weighted Underspecification.
This problem also relates to the resolution issue. The only difference between the Brennan
& Pylkkanen experiment on the one hand, and the Pickering et al. experiment whose design was
borrowed by Brennan & Pylkkanen on the other, was that the verbal predicates were not chosen
in a systematic way in the latter. If two experiments have produced seemingly conflicting re-
sults, the need to resolve the conflict arises. In this case, the most plausible account of the conflict
is that the two experiments produced conflicting results due to the choice of the verbal predi-
cates. This effect of the manipulation of verb choice is very easily interpreted under Version C
of Weighted Underspecification ; Pickering et al. employed both verbs with a puntual bias and
verbs with a durative bias, and the processing costs of those biases canceled each other in the
experimental results ; Brennan & Pylkkanen employed only those verbs with a puntual bias and
hence observed more costs with durative interpretations. In contrast, there does not seem an
obvious way to interpret the effect of the manipulation not only under Version A of Weighted
Underspecification but also under Iterated Coercion. Thus, unless an unknown interpretation
of the conflict is provided either under Version A of Weighted Underspecification or under
Iterative Coercion, the overall results rather point toward Version C of Weighted Under-
specification, rather than Iterative Coercion. However, Brennan & Pylkkanen provide no such
interpretation.
4. Conclusion
Indeed, Weighted Underspecification resembles a coercion analysis in that some processing
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costs with particular interpretations are similarly predicted. For example, Version A of Weight-
ed Underspecification predicts more costs with durative interpretations than with punctual
interpretations, just as predicted by Iterative Coercion. Indeed, it will be very hard to tease apart
the predictions of the two. However, conceptually they are different ; the former claims parallel
semantic parsing (i.e., multiple interpretations, or a range of interpretations, are kept in memory
at one time), whereas the latter claims serial semantic parsing (i.e., only one specific interpreta-
tion is kept in memory at one time).
As far as the discussion in this paper goes, a comparison between the Pickering et al. results
and the Brennan & Pylkkanen result point toward a way to tease apart the predictions of Itera-
tive Coercion on the one hand, and a specific version of Weighted Underspecification (i.e., Ver-
sion C) on the other. However, the interpretation of the conflict between the two along the line
suggested in the last section remains a speculation at this point, because it is not known empiri-
cally at this point whether the verbal predicates used in the Pickering et al. experiment are biased
toward which interpretations on the one hand, and the effects of different degrees of such biases
have not directly been examined (which we are planning to examine in the near future). How-
ever, one thing is certain : it is not as easy to decisively tease apart the predictions of different
hypotheses as Brennan & Pylkkanen assumed.
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1 Speaking precisely, lexical ambiguity between X and Y on the one hand, and underspecification of the
X/Y distinction in the lexicon on the other, are distinct claims ; only in the former is the X/Y distinction
part of the the grammar (in this case, the lexicon). However, the empirical predictions of the two are
rather hard to tease apart, and nothing in this paper hinges upon the ambiguity/underspecification
distinction. Thus the terms “ambiguity” and “underspecification” are used interchangeably throughout
in this paper.
2 They also conducted a physiological experiment, but it will not be extensively discussed in this paper
because the argument in this paper concerns the way they constructed the stimuli, which they fully
specify for the behavioral experiment, but not for the additional stimuli employed in the physiological
experiment.
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3 In fact, Kamp & Reyle’s (1993) analysis of the progressive, for example, does not employ the assumption
(). Thus () is not an assumption that everybody accept.
4 See Piango et al. (1999) for references.
5 She has more justification for distinguishing achievement and semelfactive predicates (e.g., their dis-
tinct behavior with respect to what is called the Imperfective Paradox in the modelsemantic literature),
and for treating semelfactive predicates as a special class of activity (not achievement) predicates
(based on her event lattices). However, they are beyond the scope of this paper.
6 This description might give the impression that an ambiguity conception, as opposed to under-
specification, is assumed. However, an analogy will help see that underspecification, as well as ambigu-
ity, is compatible with this description. Consider the word politician, for example. In a society where
the majority of politicians are male, the default interpretation of this word would be a male, as opposed
to female, politician. However, nobody would be willing to claim gender ambiguity for the lexical entry
for this word ; it would simply be underspecified for sex but has a bias toward a male interpretation.
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